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Abstract
THIS paper studies decision of whether outsourcing or localization in China.Both strategies can enjoy low wage advantage. But outsourcing induces
processing trade, while localization, which has additional localization cost can turn
processing trade of some goods to ordinary trade. The asymmetric effect lies on
that once localized, it is hard to return to outsourcing due to competition or fixed
expenditures involved. If wage difference larger, it is more preferable to localized.
Therefore, we can expect asymmetric effect of processing trade due to movement
of relative wage difference, which was proved by econometrics on recent data by
cointegrating analysis within a VECM model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
AS a matter of fact, foreign trade is playing a key role as the growth enginein China now1, which lets Chinese economy have the property of out-
oriented. Among all types of trade, processing trade makes use of international
resources and markets, importing intermediate inputs and exporting final goods, and
contributes a big part of economic growth. However, what determines the amount
of imported inputs in final goods? How does it vary from time to time? Economists
do not pay much attention to these questions yet.
We have the following formal definitions of trade type2.
Definition 1. Ordinary trade or General trade refers to the import or export of
goods by enterprises in China with import-export rights.
1According to National Statistics of China, Total Value of Foreign Trade has increased from 20.6
billion US$ in 1978 to 1422.1 billion US$ in 2005. Yearly average increasing rate is 26.5%, much
higher than GDP growth rate.
2Definitions come from China Custom Statistics
1
2Definition 2. Processing trade refers to the business activity of importing all or part
of the raw and auxiliary materials, parts and components, accessories, and pack-
aging materials from abroad in bond, and re-exporting the finished products after
processing or assembly by enterprises within the mainland. It includes processing
with supplied materials and processing with imported materials.
From definitions above, we can see that processing trade is arisen by outsourc-
ing of foreign companies. It is influenced by the relative difference in labor cost.
As an economy with abundant labor, more and more firms in China are now taking
part into processing trade. They receive orders abroad, importing intermediate in-
puts, and exporting finished products. This type of trade is booming in Southeast
China by making use of the comparative advantages in labor. The main force of
processing trade are those foreign invested enterprises. These firms are branches of
or contracted with multinational companies. They assembly in China, with R&D or
production of some high-tech inputs accomplished abroad.
However, with more and more educated engineers available now in China, the
part of high-tech inputs can also be finished inside China. Some cities of Southern
China can produce all the required components of computers, handphones, home
appliances, etc. In these cities, cluster production have even attracted top companies
like NEC, Philips, Panasonic to build R&D centers there. For example, NEC has
moved all its handphone affairs, from R&D to production, to China. Microsoft build
the only research institute outside U.S. in Beijing in 2001. All these facts show that
3except of outsourcing, more and more companies can localize in China now.
Although companies with high-tech plant in China can enjoy low wage advan-
tage, they also suffer from the necessary training fees and operating cost occurred
with unskilled engineers and workers, which we call localization cost. Therefore,
they face with the trade off of whether localization or simply outsourcing. A notable
effect of localization is that once they are localized, it is hard to return to outsourc-
ing, because of competition or fixed expenditures. Therefore, even the low wage
advantage disappear in some day, localization can keep their production in China.
To decide whether outsourcing or localization, one of facts worthy of consid-
eration is the proportion of high-tech inputs and low-tech inputs. Obviously, If
production involves more low-tech inputs, companies are prone to localize so that
they can save more costs.
Therefore, the following story may be true. When the relative wage difference
becomes larger, more goods are localized and the number of goods for outsourcing
will fall. Since the remaining goods for outsourcing involve more high-tech inputs,
we can expect the rise of ratio of these high-tech inputs that need import to total
amount of output. After localization, if the relative wage difference becomes lower,
it is hard for this ratio to decrease because of the already sunk fixed localization
costs.
4In mathematics, we can write
Processing import = a× processing export (1-1)
where a is the ratio of processing import to processing export. From analysis above,
we know that a increases when relative wage difference becomes larger. Contrarily,
a can not decrease too much.
We can summarize the direction of im, a, ex as below,
˙im= a˙ + e˙x
Wage Difference smaller − −
(small)
− (1-2)
Wage Difference larger + +
(large)
+ (1-3)
This paper is divided into 5 parts. After introduction, Chapter 2 reviews re-
lated literatures. Chapter 3 builds a model to explain facts that influence processing
trade in China. In chapter 4, I provide empirical evidences based on cointegrating
analysis. Chapter 5 is the concluding remark of this paper.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
LITERATURES related to this paper can be divided into three classes. 1. Ontrade theory of outsoucing and vertical FDI; 2. On analysis of China
foreign trade; 3. On Johansen’s cointegrating frame. Each topic can involve
thousands of works. Due to text limitation, I will give some clear directions to
review them instead.
On outsourcing and vertical FDI modeling. Traditional trade models focus on
1. Constant return to scale(CRTS) technology; 2. Final goods. beyond traditional
models, new models break through these two limitations. ?, ? developed models of
trade arisen by increasing return to scale(IRTS) 1. Papers on vertical integration and
inner-industry trade can be traced to ?. ? gives us detailed analysis on it. Antras
1In ?, new goods are produced in the industrialized North and exchanged for old goods produced
in the South, with technological transfer, new goods becoming old goods, at an exogenous rate. ?
endogenized it in the frame of New Growth Theory.
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6[2004], following ?, presents a model of vertical FDI vs. outsourcing, in which the
incomplete nature of contracts governing international transactions limits the extent
of integration across borders. Model developed in my paper is mainly based on
Antras [2004] with a little variation.
On analysis of China’s foreign trade. Edmonds et al. [2006] gives us a very
clear overview on China’s policy path and long trend statistics on the evolution of
foreign trade. As to the relationship between growth and trade, Lin and Li [2002]
has pointed out that the traditional methods2 have underestimated the contribution of
foreign trade in China because of an significant fact: import, especially the process-
ing import, can arise domestic consumption, investment and export because most
of processing import are intermediate inputs to industrial production. Considering
this fact, Lin and Li [2002] concludes that foreign trade has an elasticity of 0.1 to
economic growth each year, i. e., 10 percent increase in foreign trade leads to 1
percent growth in GDP.
However, economists have not pay much attentions to these analysis. Another
related paper is DEES [2001], which estimates empirical factors that influence trade
according to different trade types3.
2Traditional methods, based on an accounting identity of gross domestic product,
Y =C+ I+G+X−M
where Y ,C, G, X andM are GDP, Consumption, Government Purchase Export and Import, calculate
the contribution of foreign trade as
dX−dM
dY
.
3It deems that firms exporting products that are imported beforehand are less sensitive to relative
7Most of papers on foreign trade of China focus on the relationships between
trade and real effective exchange rate. Two main papers are popularly cited in this
field.Zhang [1996] provides some recent econometric techniques designed to as-
sess the relationship between exchange rate of the Chinese Renminbi (RMB) and
China’s trade balance4. Chou [2000] estimates the impact of exchange rate variabil-
ity on total exports5 But all these papers ignore that the asymmetry effect discussed
in Chapter 1, which induces their estimate not perfect. Usually, papers on trade and
exchange rate of China are ”partially” correct: they get satisfied results in export
analysis but unexpected results in import analysis or contrarily. I believe that the
key lies on the asymmetric property of elasticities.
On Johansen’s cointegrating frame. Johansen [1995] is the summary of it. Jo-
hansen [1992a,b, 1997, 2000a,b, 2005] provide us assistant understanding of this
frame. My paper will run cointegrating analysis under it.
price changes than firms exporting goods produced with national inputs. He looked carefully at
the different types of trade and to investigate separately their behaviors. Once depreciation, the
processing firms should benefit from cheaper imports of foreign goods and relatively cheap labor
costs in China. This type of trade should remain competitive at a worldwide level
4They find bidirectional causal relationship between the real exchange rate and trade but un-
equally. My ideas above may serve as a complement to their findings.
5In this paper, he studied exports of China by SITC category and made use of ARCH model to
detect REER volatility. Estimation results show that exchange rate variability has a long-run negative
effect on total exports, exports of manufactured goods, and exports of mineral fuels.
Chapter 3
Processing Trade in China
3.1 Setup
I follow Antras [2004] and release the production limitation of high-tech inputsin the South. Suppose that the world has two countries, China and America.
Wage rate are denoted by wCN and wUS respectively. Consumer preference can be
simplified to producer of good y facing isoelastic demand function,
y= λp
−1
1−α , 0< α< 1 (3-1)
where p is the price of the good and λ is a parameter.
Production of good y requires two kinds of inputs: high-tech inputs xh and low-
8
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tech inputs xl ,
y= ζzx1−zh x
z
l , 0≤ z≤ 1 (3-2)
where ζz = z−z(1− z)−(1−z).
The production of high and low-tech inputs in both countries requires one unit
of labor. High-tech inputs are the key components produced by high-tech plant
and low-tech inputs are labor inputs to assemble these components to final product.
Suppose both countries can produce these two types of inputs. Limited to capital
scarcity, China has difficulty to setup high-tech plants independently. Therefore,
American will determine where to produce these two type of inputs.
If they only setup assembly line in China, no additional expenditures required.
These two partners transaction by contract. Under a frame of cooperative game,
they share revenues through Nash negotiation. It is outsourcing.
However, If they build R&D center in China, there will be k times marginal cost
to produce one unit inputs due to unskilled workers and researchers in China. The
headquarter in U.S. and plant in China share revenues according to property rights
theory of ?. It is localization.
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3.2 Firm Behavior
3.2.1 Localization in China
Total revenue is
R= λ1−αζαz x
α(1−z)
h x
αz
l (3-3)
The problem is
max
xh,xl
piL = R−λwCNxh−λwCNxl (3-4)
Optimal value
piL(z) = (1−α)λ
(
kwCN
α
) −α
(1−α)
(3-5)
3.2.2 Outsourcing in China
Suppose the R&D center and Assembly line have the same negotiation power. So
each has half of the total revenue.
Problem of R&D center,
max
xh
=
1
2
R−wUSxh (3-6)
First order condition:
wUSxh =
1
2
α(1− z)R (3-7)
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Problem of assembly line,
max
xl
piO =
1
2
R−wUSxl (3-8)
First order condition:
wCNxh =
1
2
αzR (3-9)
Optimal Profit:
piO(z) =
(
1− 1
2
α
)
λ
(
2(wUS)1−z(wCN)z
α
) −α
(1−α)
(3-10)
3.3 Equilibrium Choice
3.3.1 Fixed k
Compare 3-5 and 3-10, we know that outsourcing dominates localization if and only
if
A(k,z) =
(
1−α
1− 12α
) 1−α
(1−z)α (2
k
) 1
1−z
≤ ω= w
CN
wUS
(3-11)
Given value of k, we know that limz→0A(z) = positive constant, limz→1A(z) =
+∞ and A′(z)> 0.
Under the assumption of 0< ω= w
CN
wUS < 1, we have the necessary condition for
3.3. EQUILIBRIUM CHOICE 12
outsourcing to exist, A(0)< 1. It means that
k > 2
(
1−α
1− 12α
) 1−α
(1−z)α
(3-12)
i.e. the additional localization costs are high enough.
ω
z10 z¯
A(z)
fraction for outsourcing fraction for localization
Figure 3.1: Choice of Localization vs Outsourcing
Figure 3.1 shows equilibrium choice of whether localization or not. z¯ is the
threshold z so that producer of goods involving more low-tech inputs, i.e. z> z¯, will
localize in China.
we can also see that z¯ decreases with lower ω, the relative unit labor cost of
China to America. So more producers choose localization other than outsourcing.
But suppose that localization requires fixed cost F , which should be spent in
each period. When the relative wage ω increases, some producers will not return to
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outsourcing, because the relative gains are less than F . This is the key of asymmetry
in processing trade.
3.3.2 Alterable k
It is natural to assume that k is a function of z, k′(z)< 0 and limz←0 k(z)= constant >
limz←1 k(z) = 1, which means that goods involving more high-tech inputs require
higher additional localization costs. So now,
A(z) =
(
1−α
1− 12α
) 1−α
(1−z)α ( 2
k(z)
) 1
1−z
≤ ω= w
CN
wUS
(3-13)
We still have limz→0A(z) = positive constant, limz→1A(z) = +∞. As to A′(z),
we still have
A′(z)> 0 (3-14)
Proof of Equation 3-14 is presented in Appendix B.
But now we have a flatter curve compared to that with fixed k, which means that
outsourcing may not be substituted by localization when ω goes down if additional
localization costs are sensitive to industrial structure. It can partly offset this effect.
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3.4 Import and Export
The import/export value are given by
im=
Z z¯
0
wUSxhdz=
Z z¯
0
1
2
α(1− z)Rdz
ex=
Z z¯
0
Rdz
(3-15)
So we have
a=
im
ex
=
R z¯
0
1
2α(1− z)RdzR z¯
0 Rdz
(3-16)
Differentiate it to z¯,
da
dz¯
=
R(z¯)
R z¯
0 (z− z¯)R(z)dz
(
R z¯
0 Rdz)2
< 0 (3-17)
We have already know that dz¯dω > 0, So we have
da
dω
< 0 (3-18)
Considering the fixed extra cost of localization, we know that when ω goes
down, a goes up. But when ω goes up, amay not go down at the same amount. This
is the asymmetry in processing trade. Next chapter, I will provide some empirical
evidences.
Chapter 4
Empirical Evidences
4.1 Data
FIGURES A.1-A.9 are time series plots of related variables.1. Both processing export and import increase greatly, especially after 2001.
2. Notice that REER here is an index. It increase when appreciation and decrease
when depreciation.
Reasons for I put ex as the domestic demand for im lie on the definition of
processing import. Also Granger Causality Test can tell us that ex does Granger
Cause im, as is shown in Table 4.2.
IFS provides the real effective exchange rate based on normalized unit labor
cost, which is the best proxy of ω. But unfortunately, code line of this variable is
blank. It is also hard to get monthly wage of China.
15
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Table 4.1: Variables
Export(PT) ex source: China Custom Statistics monthly re-
port. 1997.01-2005.10
Import(PT) im source: China Custom Statistics monthly re-
port. 1997.01-2005.10
Foreign demand f d weighted foreign GDP of Hongkong, Japan,
Korea, Italy, UK, German, Canada, US, Aus-
trilia. the weight is its import from China di-
vided by total export of China. interpolated
into monthly data by quadratic sum to aver-
age.
Domestic demand dd source:Industrial Statistics of China. it is
the added value of industrial production of
China.
REER reer source: International Financial Statistics.
code: 924..RECZF.... period average index
number.
OPEN open export plus import divided by GDP.
Table 4.2: Granger Causality Test for ex and im
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
im does not Granger Cause ex 105 0.11372 0.73664
ex does not Granger Cause im 20.7043 0.00002
4.1. DATA 17
One way to solve this problem is to assume neoclassical type of labor market
and labor markets of China and Foreign move together to keep the ratio of real wage
constant. So we have
ω=
wCN
wUS
=
wˆCN pCN
wˆUSpUS
=Const.
pCN
pUS
(4-1)
where wˆ is real wage. Notice that the upper script US stands for the world now.
Therefore, the relative difference in labor cost can be approximately measured
by the real effective exchange rate based on CPI. Figure 4.1 show that the ratio of
processing import to export variates inversely to real exchange rate.
The exchange rate of RMB has suffered great pressure of appreciation because
the foreign trade was booming and foreign capital flowed quickly into China in early
2000s. Theoretically, real exchange appreciation of RMB will increase prices of the
export goods, while decrease that of import ones, then the volume of export will
decline but that of import will ascend. However, this analysis has the assumption
that all tradable goods are final consumption goods,ignoring the impact of trade
types.
There are still other variables that should be controlled in the model.
Firstly, the demand effect. So we add foreign demand and domestic demand
data.
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Figure 4.1: Ratio of Processing Import to export and Real Effective Exchange Rate
Secondly, we must take into account of the integration effect. In the last ten
years, more and more Chinese firms involved into processing trade, which will lead
to bias if we do not control it. Thus I use open as the proxy of integration.
4.2 Econometric Model
For processing trade, firstly, we expect that there is asymmetric effect on the elastic-
ity of REER. So I add a dummy variable d into the equations, where d equals to 1 if
depreciation and 0 if appreciation. d can stand for different elasticities. Regression
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equations are
ext = γ11+(γ12+ γ13d)reert + γ14ddt + γ15opent (4-2a)
imt = γ21+(γ22+ γ23d)reert + γ24ext + γ25opent (4-2b)
Equation (4-2) describe the processing trade systems of China. Once all the
coefficients are estimated, we can subtract im by ex to get the function of a, the ratio
of processing import to export.
As we have mentioned, a is decreasing in reer and decrease fast when depreci-
ation of reer. As to the demand effect, we know that more foreign demand, market
size of certain good is bigger to alleviate competition. Therefore, when ω lower, a
will not increase as much as usual. Regarding to the integration effect, more firms
involved, more competition, which will drive companies to the production of more
capital intensive goods. So a rise.
In sum, we have the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis I: a decreases in reer.
Hypothesis II: a decreases more when depreciation.
Hypothesis III: a decreases in f d.
Hypothesis IV: a increases in open.
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4.3 VECM Representation
It is more reliable to capture long-run relationship of the model by cointegrating
analysis.
Let z as the vector variables to describe processing trade systems. i.e.
z= (ex, im,reer,dreer, f d,open)′
The vector autoregression for z can be written in vector error correction model
format as
∆zt = αβ′zt−1+Σ
p−1
j=1Γ j∆zt− j+Γ0+ εt (4-3)
where β′zt−1 consists of r(< n) cointegrating relationships.
We can impose three types of restrictions on the columns of β′ to test our hy-
potheses stated above.
1. Just-identification restrictions to normalize coefficients.
2. Over-identification restrictions to specify demand effects of each equation
respectively.
3. Additional over-identification restrictions to detect whether the dummy vari-
able d make sense or not.
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4.4 ADF Test
Since cointegration test requires a certain stochastic structure of the time series in-
volved, the first step in the estimation procedure is to determine if the variables
should be non-stationary in levels (should contain a unit root). To be able to know
the order of integration of the series that make up vector z, the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF) has been used.
Table 4.3 show that all variables except dreer are I(1) process. So we can use
Johansen’s framework to conduct VECM estimate.
4.5 Cointegration Analysis
We use the maximum likelihood estimation procedure explained by Johansen [1995],
using the full system unrestricted vector autoregressive model. We follow a testing
strategy that initially allows for the impact of a constant and deterministic trend in
the restricted cointegration space. The selection of our final model is based on one
lag (selected by SIC).
The test results reported in Table 4.4 suggest there may be as many as 2 coin-
tegrating vectors on the basis of maximum likelihood and max-eigenvalue tests,
although trace test suggests there are four vectors in the model. A priori, we expect
there to be 2 cointegrating relations among all variables one for each of the endoge-
nous variables, export and import. I will use r=2, so that cointegrating rank equals
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Table 4.3: ADF Unit Root Tests
Variablea Lagsb t-statistic 5% Critical value
Level
ex 2 -0.977 -3.454
im 2 -1.465 -3.454
f d 0 -1.893 -3.548
dd 2 -1.341 -3.454
reer 0 -2.082 -3.453
dreer 0 -8.623 -2.889
open 3 -0.451 -3.454
1st difference
ex 1 -11.55 -2.890
im 1 -11.61 -2.890
f d 0 -5.707 -2.954
dd 0 -15.42 -2.889
reer 0 -8.658 -2.889
open 0 -18.18 -2.889
a All variables except REER are specified with intercept and linear trend as ex-
ogenous when test in level, only intercept as exogenous when test in 1st differ-
ence. REER is specified with intercept as exogenous when test in level, none as
exogenous when test in 1st difference.
b selected by SIC.
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Table 4.4: Johansen’s Test for Cointegrating Vectors
H0 H1 Trace Critical Value Max Eigenvalue Critical Value
Processing Trade ex, im,reer,dreer, f d,open
r = 0 r > 0 160.7** 103.8 67.01** 40.96
r ≤ 1 r > 1 93.68** 76.97 35.18** 34.86
r ≤ 2 r > 2 58.50** 54.08 23.13 28.59
r ≤ 3 r > 3 35.38** 35.19 21.05 22.30
r ≤ 4 r > 4 14.33 20.26 9.023 15.89
r ≤ 5 r > 5 5.304 9.165 5.304 9.165
a All tests are specified as intercept (no trend) in CE and VARwith 1 lag, selected
by SIC.
b ** indicate 95% significant level.
to the number of endogenous variables.
Now we can impose restrictions on β matrix according to the discussion above.
The long-run equations of the model are over-identified using the following restric-
tions:

β11 = 1∗ β12 = 0∗
β22 = 1∗ β25 = 0

The just-identified restrictions are indicated by *.
First of all, we should test additional over-identified restrictions, as is shown in
Table 4.5.
Therefore, we accept the additional over-identified restriction of β24 = 0. i.e.
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Table 4.5: Additional Over-identified Restrictions Test
none restriction not binding
β14 = 0 χ2(1) = 5.970 p− value= 0.015
β24 = 0 χ2(1) = 0.324 p− value= 0.569
β14 = 0, β24 = 0 χ2(2) = 40.77 p− value= 0.000
given that processing import is normal, asymmetry is more likely to happen in
processing export.
Secondly, we need to set the lag length by SIC. Table 4.6 suggests 1 period lag.
Table 4.6: Lag Length Selection
Lag 0 1 2 3
SIC -20.04 -20.04 -18.90 -17.98
Results of cointegrating relationships are reported in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Restricted Cointegrating Vectors of Processing Trade Model
ex im reer dreer f d open Constant
Normalized β vectors
CointEq1 1.000 0.000 1.891 0.224 -0.073 -2.819 -9.955
(1.038) (0.026) (0.078) (0.269)
[ 1.822] [ 8.749] [-0.939] [-10.48]
CointEq2 0.885 1.000 2.009 0.302 0.000 -5.695 -11.69
(0.143) (1.461) (0.036) (0.617)
[ 6.207] [ 1.375] [ 8.418] [-9.238]
a logL= 1185, SIC=-20.04.
b standard errors in the parentheses and t-statistics in the brackets.
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The first comment from Table 4.7 confirms the main intuition and Hypotheses I
and II.
1. Real exchange rate movements have negative influences on both export(elasticity
equal to 1.89) and import(elasticity equal to 2.01).
2. The impact of world demand is not significant, albeit the correct direction. As
a control variable, I will keep it left here.
3. The effect of integration is significantly positive. Moreover, integration has a
double times effect on import than on export. This may be caused by the com-
petition among firms. If more and more firms enter market, competition will
drive some of them to do outsourcing of goods with more high-tech inputs,
to avoid competition. Thus integration will cause more import of high-tech
inputs.
Secondly, there is significant effect of asymmetry in both export and import:
coefficient on dummy variable is about 0.22 and 0.30. So depreciation can have
additional influence than appreciation. It can stimulate processing trade in China
greatly.
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4.6 Further on Asymmetry
Cointegration analysis implies the following relationships.
ex=−(1.89+0.22d)reer+0.07 f d+2.82open+9.96 (4-4a)
im=−(2.01+0.30d)reer+0.88ex+5.70open+11.69 (4-4b)
Therefore, solve from equations (4-4a) and (4-4b), we have
loga= im− ex=−(1.78+0.27d)reer−0.008 f d+5.36open+10.49 (4-5)
as claimed before, a is the ratio of processing import to export. Equation (4-5)
confirms our Hypotheses III and IV.
Now we have proved equation (3-18) by empirical work.
Chapter 5
Concluding Remark
THIS paper studies one of the important features in processing trade in China.I build a model to illustrate the relationship between the ratio of processing
import to export and relative wage difference. Empirical work by cointegrating
analysis provide us evidences and confirm what I state in Chapter1.
The main conclusion of this paper is that the ratio of processing import to ex-
port is influenced by relative wage difference-the industry effect and competition
effect. The results of the present study claim to look carefully at processing trade,
where China is now in the transition from low add-value industries to high add-value
industries. The paper also gives some elements to understand why multinational
companies take localization strategy in China. Finally, according to predictions
concerning the change in the Chinese competitiveness resulting from the entry into
WTO, we can expect processing trade will boom continuously because it faces up
27
28
with much larger markets and more resources. The processing firms should benefit
from cheaper imports of foreign goods and relatively cheap labor costs in China.
This type of trade should remain competitive at a worldwide level.
Appendix A
Data Plot
Data plots in this appendix have the same unit:
vertical axis: Billion US$.
horizontal axis: Year 1997-2005.
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Appendix B
Mathematics
Theorem 3. A′(z)> 0
Proof. On A′(z), firstly, we take the logarithm of A(z).
logA(z) =
1−α
α(1− z) log
1−α
1− 12α
− 1
1− zlog
k(z)
2
(2-1)
Differentiate both side on z,⇒
∂ logA(z)
∂z
=−(1− z)−2
(
(1− z)∂ logk
∂z
+ logk− 1−α
α
log
1−α
1− 12α
)
(2-2)
So we still have A′(z)> 0 if and only if
(1− z)∂ logk
∂z
+ logk− 1−α
α
log
1−α
1− 12α
> 0 (2-3)
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This is an ordinary differential equation, which has an eigenvalue equal to− 11−z .
Given z ∈ [0,1], the eigenvalue is negative. Therefore, the ODE is globally stable,
which has a phase diagram as Figure B.1
z
0
z?
1
Figure B.1: Phase Diagram
So the only thing we need to do is to prove z? > 1.
Consider the ODE 2-3 at point z= 1. We have the reduced form of ODE as
logk(1)− 1−α
α
log
1−α
1− 12α
= 0− 1−α
α
log
1−α
1− 12α
=−1−α
α
log
1−α
1− 12α
> 0
(2-4)
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